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Abstract
Experimental evidence suggest that people only use a few iterations of strategic reasoning, and
that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel
evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in a ﬁnitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma, and each agent is characterized by the number of steps he thinks ahead. When
two agents interact, each of them has an independent probability to observe the opponent's type.
We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the evolutionary process admits a
unique stable outcome, in which the population includes a mixture of naive agents who think 1
step ahead, and moderately-sophisticated agents who think up to 3 steps ahead.
Keywords: Indirect evolution, evolutionary stability, cognitive hierarchy, bounded forward-looking,
Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation. JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D03.
1 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggest that in new strategic interactions most people only use a few
iterations of strategic reasoning. This stylized fact is observed in diﬀerent forms in various
contexts. First, when playing long ﬁnite games, people only look a few stages ahead and
use backward induction reasoning to a limited extent. For example, players usually defect
only at the last couple of stages when playing ﬁnitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, (see, e.g.,
Selten and Stoecker (1986)) and Centipede games (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995); Nagel and
∗I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Vince Crawford, Ariel Rubinstein, Peyton
Young, and seminar participants at University of Birmingham, University of Oxford and University College
London, for many useful comments, discussions and ideas.
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Tang (1998)), and when interacting in sequential bargaining, players ignore future bargaining
opportunities that are more than 1-2 steps ahead (Neelin, Sonnenschein, and Spiegel (1988);
Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002)). Second, when facing iteratively dominated
strategies, almost everyone make the ﬁrst iteration (not playing a dominated action), many
do the second iteration - assume that their opponent does not play dominated strategies, a few
make the third iteration, and further iterations are rare (see, e.g., Costa-Gomes, Crawford,
and Broseta (2001); Rapoport and Amaldoss (2004); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006)).
Third, according to the models of cognitive hierarchy (or level-k), most players best respond
to a belief that others use at most two iterations of strategic reasoning (see, e.g., Stahl and
Wilson (1994); Nagel (1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo,
Nagel, and Satorra (2002); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004); Crawford and Iriberri (2007)).
A second stylized fact is the heterogeneity of the population: some people systemically
use less iterations than others (Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005); Costa-Gomes and Crawford
(2006); Hyndman, Terracol, and Vaksmann (2012)). These observations raise two related
evolutionary puzzles. The ﬁrst puzzle is why people only use few steps. Experimental evi-
dence suggest that using more iterations is only unintuitive but not computationally complex
(at-least in simple games): with appropriate guidance and feedback players can learn to use
many iterations in a given game (Crawford (2008); Camerer (2003, Section 5.3.5)). In many
games, being able to do one more step than the opponent gives a substantial advantage.
As the cognitive cost of an additional level is moderate, it is puzzling why there was not an
arms race in which people learn to use more strategic iterations throughout the evolutionary
process (red queen eﬀect, see Robson (2003)).
The second puzzle is how the naive people, who systematically use less iterations than
the more sophisticated agents, survived the evolutionary process. At ﬁrst glance, it seems
that sophisticated agents would outperform naive agents due to the beneﬁt of thinking one
level ahead. In this paper we present an evolutionary model that explains both puzzles and
yields a unique sharp prediction: an heterogeneous population of naive agents and moderately-
sophisticated agents, in which everyone uses only 1-3 strategic iterations. Our model focuses
on bounded forward-looking in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We believe that it can also
shed light on other forms of bounded iterative reasoning.
Following the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth and Yaari (1992)) we present a
reduced-form static analysis for a dynamic process that describes the evolution of types in
a large population of agents.1 This process can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways: (1)
1 The indirect approach was mainly used to study evolution of preferences, and it is related the literature
on strategic delegation (e.g., Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai (1991)). Following, Stahl (1993); Stennek (2000);
Frenkel, Heller, and Teper (2012), we apply it to analyze evolution of cognitive biases.
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C D
C A,A A+1,0
D A+1,0 1,1
Tab. 1: Payoﬀ at the symmetric stage game Prisoner's Dilemma (A > 3.15).
biological process - types are genetically determined, and the payoﬀ is the expected number
of oﬀspring, and (2) learning and imitation process - an agent's type describes the way he
perceives strategic interactions; once in a while an agent may decide to change his strategic
framework and imitate another person's type, if the other person is more successful.
At each generation the agents in the population are randomly matched and each couple
plays M times (without rematching) the symmetric stage game of the Prisoner's Dilemma
with the payoﬀs given in Table 1:2 mutual cooperation (both players play C) yields both
players A > 3.15, mutual defection (both players play D) gives 1, and if a single player
defects, he obtains A + 1 and his opponent gets 0. Note that the parameter A is the ratio
between what can be gained by mutual cooperation to the additional payoﬀ that is obtained
by defecting.3
Each agent in our model has a type (level) in the set {L1, ..., LM} that determines how
many steps he looks ahead. An agent of type Lk looks k steps ahead in his strategic reasoning.
When the horizon (the number of remaining stages) is larger than k the agent must follow a
simple heuristic. We assume that this heuristic must satisfy two properties: (1) nice (never
be the ﬁrst player to defect), and (2) retaliating - defect if the opponent defected in the
previous stage. Two examples for such heuristics are grim and tit-for-tat.4 When the
horizon is equal to k, the agent begins to play strategically and he may choose any action.
We interpret Lk's behavior to stem from bounded forward-looking: when the horizon is larger
than k, he subjectively perceives it to be inﬁnite, and he does not take into account the fact
that the interaction has a well-deﬁned ﬁnal period, and that this ﬁnal period has strategic
implications. One can also consider our model as a reduced-form for an interaction with a
random unknown long length, in which each type Lk gets a signal about the interaction's
2 All our results are independent of the value ofM (given thatM ≥ 4). The inequality A > 3.15 is required
for the solution we characterize below to be evolutionary stable in a non-empty interval of p-s.
3 We assume that defection yields the same additional payoﬀ (relative to cooperation) regardless of the
opponent's strategy to simplify the presentation of the result (but the results remain qualitatively similar
also without this assumption). Given this assumption we normalize, without loss of generality, the payoﬀ of
being a single cooperator to be 0, and the additional payoﬀ of defecting to be 1.
4 Grim heuristic defects if and only if the opponent ever defected in the past, and Tit-for-tat heuristic
defects if and only if the opponent defected in the previous stage. In Section 7 we discuss the extension of
our model to a setup in which a player may choose his heuristic for long horizons, and the relation to the
notion of analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)).
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realized length k periods before the end (see Section 7). Note that the set of strategies of type
Lk is a strict subset of the set of strategies of type Lk+1, and that type LM is fully-rational
and has an unlimited set of strategies.
We assume that types are partially observable in the following way (similar to Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)): before the interaction begins, each agent has an independent
probability p to observe his opponent's type.5 Informally, this can be interpreted as an
opportunity to observe your opponent's past behavior, or to observe a trait that is correlated
with cognitive level (such as I.Q. level, see Gill and Prowse (2012)). The total payoﬀ of an
agent of type Lk is the undiscounted sum of payoﬀs in the repeated prisoner dilemma minus
an arbitrarily small cost that is increasing in k (a marginal cost for having a better forward
looking-ability).
In common with much of the evolutionary literature, we use a static solution concept to
tractably capture the stable points of a dynamic evolutionary process. Speciﬁcally, we adapt
the notion of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS, Maynard-Smith (1974)) to a setup with
diﬀerent types. In such a setup, the state of the population is described by a conﬁguration
(Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)) - a pair consisting of a distribution of types and the
(possibly mixed) strategy that each type uses in the game. A conﬁguration is evolutionary
stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who invades the population is outperformed
by the incumbents in the post-entry population.6
Evolutionary stability can be sustained by playing very badly when facing types outside
the support of the distribution. However, this is unlikely to be stable in the long run,
as the strategy played against a non-existing type should slowly evolve as a response to
recurrent entrees of mutants. Thus, we reﬁne neutral stability by requiring agents to play
undominated strategies against non-existing types. In Section 6 we show that our results are
robust to various plausible changes in the deﬁnition of stability in this setup, and to using
the alternative notion of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007).
Our main result shows that if p is not too close to 0 and 1 (and this interval is increasing in
A), then there exists a unique evolutionary stable conﬁguration with undominated strategies,
which includes two kind of players: (1) naive agents of type L1 who only begin defecting
at the last stage, (2) moderately-sophisticated agents of type L3: usually they defect two
stages before the end, unless they observe that their opponent is sophisticated, and in this
case, they begin defecting one stage earlier. The stability relies on the balance between the
5 The results remain the same also in the case in which agents can only observe lower opponents' type (see
section 6).
6 The mutants achieve the same payoﬀ if they are equivalent to the incumbents: have the same distribu-
tion of types and play the same on-equilibrium-path. If they are not equivalent, we require the mutants to
achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ.
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direct disadvantage of naive agents - they defect too late, and the indirect commitment
advantage - when naivety is being observed, it induces moderately-sophisticated opponents
to postpone their defection (as naive agents are committed to cooperate longer), and this
allows an additional round of mutual cooperation. The proportion of the naive players is
increasing in both p and A.
It is interesting to note that stable conﬁgurations are very diﬀerent when p is close to
0 or 1. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations must include fully-rational players who, when
facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages. When p is close to 0, types are too
rarely observed, and the indirect advantage of naive agents is too weak. When p is close to
1, there is an arms-race between sophisticated agents who observe each other: each such
agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The result of this race is that there
must be some fully-rational agents in the population.
Existing evolutionary models that studied bounded strategic reasoning (Stahl (1993);
Stennek (2000)) focused on the case where types are unobservable (p = 0) , and showed
that in various games: (1) the most sophisticated type always survives, and (2) lower (more
naive) types can also survive if they do not play serially dominated strategies. Recently,
Mohlin (2012) showed that there may be evolutionary stable conﬁgurations in which the
highest type do not survive, and he also studied the case in which higher types can perfectly
observe lower types (a case similar to p = 1, see Section 6).7 This paper focuses in a speciﬁc
game (repeated prisoner dilemma) and allow partial observability (p strictly between 0 and
1), and this allow us to obtain a sharp and qualitative diﬀerent prediction: only naive and
moderately-sophisticated agents survive.
Existing experimental results verify the plausibility of both our assumption of using nice
and retaliating heuristic for large horizons, and of our main prediction. Selten and Stoecker
(1986) study the behavior of players in iterated Prisoner Dilemma games of 10 rounds (similar
results are presented in Andreoni and Miller (1993); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross
(1996); Bruttel, Güth, and Kamecke (2012)). They show that: (1) if any player defected,
then almost always both players defect at all remaining stages, (2) usually there is mutual
cooperation in the ﬁrst 6 rounds, and (3) players begin defecting at the last 1-4 rounds.8 Such
behavior has two main explanations in the literature: (1) some players are altruistic, and (2)
7 See also Crawford (2003) for a strategic (non-evolutionary) model of zero-sum games with cheap-talk
in which naive and sophisticated agents may co-exist and obtain the same payoﬀ.
8 In Selten and Stoecker (1986)'s experiments players engaged in 25 sequences (super-games) of iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma. The above results describe the behavior of subjects in the last 13 sequences (after
the initial 12 sequences in which players are inexperienced and their actions are noisier). During these 13
sequences there is a slow drift in the behavior of players towards earlier defections. Nevertheless, defections
before the last 4 rounds were infrequent also in the last couple of rounds.
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players have limited forward-looking.9 Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002) studied
the relative importance of these explanations in a related sequential bargaining game, and
their ﬁndings suggest the limited forward-looking is the main cause for this behavior.
A recent qualitative support for our prediction is given in Hyndman, Terracol, and Vaks-
mann (2012), which experimentally studied the strategic behavior of people across diﬀerent
games. They showed that a fraction of the players consistently assign a low level of reasoning
to their opponent, while the remaining players alternate between diﬀerent assessments of
their opponent's cognitive skills. The former fraction corresponds to the naive agents in
our model who always best-reply to a belief that the opponent is non-strategic and follows
a nice and retaliating heuristic. The remaining players correspond to the moderately-
sophisticated agents in our model who, depending on the signal they obtain, best reply to
diﬀerent beliefs about the opponent's cognitive skill.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In Section 4 we present
our results, and it is followed by sketches of the proofs in Section ?? (formal proofs appear in
the appendix). Sections 6 shows that our results are robust to various changes in the model.
We conclude in Section 7.
2 Model
2.1 Strategies and Types
We study a symmetric ﬁnitely-iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game that repeatsM stages (M ≥
4), denoted by G. The payoﬀ of each stage game are as described in Table 1 (A > 2 +
√
2).
This payoﬀ is interpreted, as standard in the evolutionary literature, as representing success
or ﬁtness. Deﬁne the horizon of a stage as the number of remaining stages including the
current stage. That is, the horizon at stage m is equal to M − k + 1. History hk of length
k is a sequence of k pairs, where the l-th pair describes the actions chosen by the players at
stage l. Let Hk be the sets of histories of length k, and let H = ∪1≤k<MHk be the set of all
non-terminal histories.
A pure strategy s is a function from H into {C,D}. A , and a behavioral strategy σ is a
function from H into ∆ ({C,D}). With some abuse of notations we write σ (hk) = C when
σ assigns probability 1 to playing C (and similarly for D). Let Σ be the set of behavioral
strategies (henceforth, strategies). Strategy σ is k-nice-retaliating if whenever the horizon is
larger than k: (1) σ assigns probability 1 to C if the opponent has never defected before, and
9 Heifetz and Pauzner (2005) explain this behavior with a diﬀerent kind of cognitive limitations: at each
node, each player has a small probability to be confused and choose a diﬀerent action than the optimal one.
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(2) σ assigns probability 1 to D if the opponent has defected in the previous stage. Let Σk
be the set of k-Nice-Retaliating behavioral strategies. Let dk ∈ Σk be the pure strategy that
plays grim as long as the horizon is larger then k: defects if and only if the opponent has
defected in the past, and then defects at all following stages (when the horizon is at most k).
Let D = {dk}0≤k≤M be the set of all such grim-then-defect strategies. Let u (σ, σ′) be the
expected payoﬀ of a player who plays strategy σ against an opponent who plays behavioral
strategy σ′.
We imagine a large population randomly matched to play G. Diﬀerent agents in the pop-
ulation diﬀer in their cognitive ability, which is captured by their type. Let L = {L1, ..., LM}
be the set of types (or levels).10 An agent of type Lk looks only k steps ahead, and when
the horizon is larger than k he ignores end-of-game strategic considerations and plays a nice
and retaliating heuristic . That is, an agent with type Lk can only play k-nice-retaliating
strategies. When the horizon is at most k, the agent is no longer limited in his play.
Let c : L → R+ a strictly increasing function satisfying c (L1) = 0, and let δ > 0. Agents
of type Lk bear a cognitive cost of δ · c (Lk). In the analysis in the following sections we will
focus on the case where δ is suﬃciently small (arbitrarily low cognitive costs). The payoﬀ of
the repeated game is the undiscounted sum of the stage payoﬀs minus the cognitive cost.
Following the model of partial observability of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), we
assume that each player knows the type of his opponent with probability p (and get no
information about his opponent's type with probability 1 − p), independently of the event
that his opponent knows his type. We use the term stranger to describe an opponent that
his type was not observed. In Section 6 we demonstrate that our results remain the same
also if agents can only identify their opponent's type if that type is lower.
2.2 Conﬁgurations
The state of the population is described by a conﬁguration - a pair consisting of a distribution
of types and the strategy that each type uses in the game. Formally (where C (µ)denote the
support of µ):
Deﬁnition 1. Conﬁguration (or population) (µ, b) is a pair where µ ∈ ∆ (L) is the distribu-
tion of types in the population, and b = (bk)k∈C(µ) is the proﬁle of signal-dependent strategies
is played by each type in the population. That is, for each type Lk ∈ C (µ), bk : L ∪ ∅ → Σk
is a signal-dependent strategy that speciﬁes a behavioral k-nice-retaliating strategy for each
10 We explicitly omit level 0 (L0, who uses a nice and retaliating heuristic throughout the entire interaction).
The results are qualitatively the same if L0 is included (see Subsection 6.1.1).
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possible observation about the opponent's type (including observations with zero probability
of types outside C (µ)).
Remark 1. We note two points regarding Deﬁnition 1:
• Agents of type Lk can use a behavioral (non-pure) strategy. As usual in such models,
this can be interpreted as either: (1) each agent randomly chooses his actions, or (2) dif-
ferent fractions of type Lk play diﬀerent pure strategies, and the aggregate distribution
induces the randomness.
• A conﬁguration also determines the strategies that are used against non-existing types
(mutant types outside C (µ)). In Section 6 we propose an alternative stability notion,
according to which, a conﬁguration only determines that strategies that are used against
types with positive frequency (similar to the deﬁnition of a conﬁguration in Dekel, Ely,
and Yilankaya (2007)).
Given a conﬁguration (µ, b), we call the types in C (µ) as existing types or incumbents,
and types outside C (µ) as non-existing types or mutant types. Next, we deﬁne the mixture
of two conﬁgurations as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Let (µ, b) and (µ′, b′) be conﬁgurations, and let 0 <  < 1. The mixture
conﬁguration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
= (1− ) (µ, b) +  (µ′, b′) is:
• µ˜ = (1− )µ+ µ′.
• For each k ∈ C (µ˜):
b˜k =
(1− ) · µ (Lk) bk +  · µ′ (Lk) b′k
µ (Lk) + µ′ (Lk)
.
When  is small we interpret (1− ) (µ, b)+ (µ′, b′) as the post-entry conﬁguration : a pop-
ulation of incumbents in state (µ, b) that was invaded by  mutants with conﬁguration(µ′, b′).
Finally, we deﬁne that two conﬁgurations are equivalent if they have the same distribution,
and they induce the same observed play. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3. Conﬁgurations (µ, b) and (µ′, b′) are equivalent (denoted by (µ, b) ≈ (µ′, b′))
if:
1. µ = µ′.
2. For each pair of types Lk, Lk′ ∈ C (µ), the observed play when type Lk plays against
type Lk′ is the same in both populations.
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Note that two equivalent conﬁgurations induce the same observable play only on the equi-
librium path. Following the invasion of  mutants, the incumbents in each of the equivalent
conﬁgurations may act very diﬀerently when facing mutants.
3 Evolutionary Stability
3.1 Solution Concept
In a model without types, the state of the population is described by a strategy. A strategy
is neutrally (resp., evolutionary) stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who invades
the population and play an arbitrary strategy would achieve a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ
than the incumbents. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4. (Maynard-Smith (1974); Maynard Smith (1982)) Strategy σ ∈ Σ is neutrally
(resp., evolutionary) stable if for any mutant strategy σ′ (resp., σ′ 6= σ) there exists some
σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every 0 <  < σ′ :
u (σ, σ′ + (1− )σ) ≥ u (σ′, σ′ + (1− )σ) .
(resp., u (σ, σ′ + (1− )σ) > u (σ′, σ′ + (1− )σ)).
In what follows we extend the notion of evolutionary stability from strategies to conﬁgu-
rations. Given two conﬁgurations (µ, b) and (µ′, b′) deﬁne u ((µ, b) , (µ′, b′)) as the expected
payoﬀ of a player from population (µ, b) who plays against an opponent from population
(µ′, b′) (and the type of each player is observed with independent probability p). A con-
ﬁguration is neutrally (evolutionary) stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who
invades the population would obtain a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ than the incumbents in
the post-entry population. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5. Conﬁguration (µ, b) is neutrally (resp., evolutionary) stable if for any mutant
conﬁguration (µ′, b′) (resp., any (µ′, b′) 6≈ (µ, b)) there exists some σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for
every 0 <  < σ′ :
u ((µ, b) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) ≥ u ((µ′, b′) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) .
(resp., u ((µ, b) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) > u ((µ′, b′) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) .)
Deﬁnition 5 is closely related to Maynard Smith (1982)'s Deﬁnition 4 in two ways:
1. When the set of types is a singleton, then Deﬁnition 5 and Deﬁnition 4 coincide.
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2. Consider the following 2-player meta-game: each player chooses a type Lk and a signal-
dependent k-nice-retaliating strategy. Note that a mixed strategy in this meta-game is
a conﬁguration, and a neutrally stable strategy in the meta-game is a neutrally stable
conﬁguration.
Remark 2. Note that:
1. Any evolutionary stable conﬁguration is also neutrally stable.
2. Evolutionary stable conﬁgurations are only weakly stable to invasions of mutants who
play exactly like the incumbents on-equilibrium-path.
With some abuse of notation we denote by Lk also the distribution that assigns mass 1 to type
Lk. It is well-known that any neutrally stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Proposition 1
shows that the strategy proﬁle in a neutrally stable conﬁguration is: (1) balanced - yield the
same payoﬀ to all types in the population, and (2) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let (µ, b) be a neutrally stable conﬁguration. Then, the strategy proﬁle b: (1)
induces the same payoﬀ for each type in the support of µ, and (2) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in the Bayesian game with distribution of types µ.
Proof.
1. Assume to the contrary that b induces diﬀerent payoﬀs to diﬀerent types. Let Lk ∈
C (µ) be the type with the highest payoﬀ. Then: u ((Lk, bk) , (µ, b)) > u ((µ, b) , (µ, b)).
This implies that for suﬃciently small  > 0, mutants of type Lk who play bk would
achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ than the incumbents and this contradicts the stability
of (µ, b).
2. Assume to the contrary that b is not a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Let Lk ∈ C (µ)
be the type who does not play a best response against (µ, b). This implies that there
exists strategy b
′
k such that : u ((Lk, b
′
k) , (µ, b)) > u ((Lk, bk) , (µ, b)). By the ﬁrst part of
the proposition, u ((Lk, bk) , (µ, b)) = u ((µ, b) , (µ, b)). This implies that for suﬃciently
small  > 0, mutants of type Lk who play b
′
k would obtain a strictly higher than the
incumbents and this contradicts the stability of (µ, b).
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3.2 Result (Stability)
Our ﬁrst result characterizes an evolutionary stable conﬁguration, (µ∗, b∗) , in which naive
players (type L1) and moderately-sophisticated players (type L3) co-exist. Let the conﬁgu-
ration (µ∗, b∗) be deﬁned as follows:
1. The population includes only types L1 and L3:
µ∗ (L1) =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ · c (L3)
p (A− 1) , µ
∗ (L3) =
1− δ · c (L3)
p (A− 1) .
2. The naive Agents of type L1 play d1 : use grim until the last stage, and defect at
the last stage.
3. The moderately-sophisticated agents of type L3 play:
(a) d2 against strangers and observed L1 (follow grim until the last 2 stages, and
defect in last 2 remaining stages).
(b) d3 against any observed type diﬀerent then L1.
Theorem 1. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then (µ∗, b∗) is
evolutionary stable.
The formal proof appears in Appendix A.1. In what follows we brieﬂy sketch the outline of
the proof. First, we show that b∗ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (given µ∗). Naive players (L1)
play their unique dominating strategy - d1 (as they must follow their nice and retaliating
heuristic when the horizon is larger than 1). For sophisticated players, playing d3 against
sophisticated opponents is strictly better than an earlier defection for small enough p, and
playing d2 against strangers and naive opponents is strictly better than earlier defections if
µ (L1) is large enough.
Next, we show that (µ∗, b∗) is balanced. In order to show it, we compare the ﬁtness
of naive and sophisticated agents as a function of their opponent. Naive agents succeed
more only against an observing sophisticated opponent (who observed their type), because
their observed naivety induces an additional round of mutual cooperation. Sophisticated
agents achieve a better payoﬀ in the two other cases: against naive opponents and against
an unobserving sophisticated opponent. This implies that there is a unique level of µ (L1)
that balances the payoﬀ of the two kinds of players. Finally, we use these two properties to
show resistance to mutations. If  more naive players join the populations, then due to the
previous arguments, naive agents would have a strictly lower payoﬀ than the incumbents (on
average). The same holds for  more moderately-sophisticated who join the population.
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4 Uniqueness
4.1 Undominated Conﬁgurations
The interaction admits additional evolutionary stable conﬁgurations. One such conﬁguration
is described in the following example.
Example. Consider the conﬁguration that assigns mass 1 to fully-rational agents (type
LM) who deviate at all stages against any observed opponent's type. One can see that
this conﬁguration is evolutionary stable. However, the stability relies on the incumbents
defecting at all stages against naive mutants (L1). Such a strategy is strictly dominated by
an alternative strategy that cooperates for the ﬁrst M − 2 stages against naive opponents.
Thus, in the long run, as a response to recurrent entrees of naive mutants, incumbents
are expected to evolve into cooperation at the ﬁrst stages of the game when facing naive
opponents, and the stability of the conﬁguration will be lost.
Motivated by this example, we reﬁne neutral stability by not allowing agents to use bad
strategies against non-existing types. The payoﬀ of an incumbent's strategy that is played
against a mutant type, depends on that mutant's strategy. One may expect that most of the
time invading mutants will best-reply to the incumbents because (see, Swinkels (1992)) either:
(1) best-reply mutants have higher ﬁtness than other mutants, and thus they are expected
to survive longer in the post-entree population; or/and (2) mutants choose their strategy by
experimentation, and they are more likely to choose best-reply strategies. Formally:
Deﬁnition 6. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration and let Lk˜ ∈ L\C (µ) be a mutant type. A signal-
dependent strategy b˜k˜ : L∪∅ → Σk˜ is best-reply if u
((
Lk˜, b˜k˜
)
, (µ, b)
)
≥ u
((
Lk˜, b
′
k˜
)
, (µ, b)
)
for each alternative signal-dependent strategy b′
k˜
: L ∪ ∅ → Σk˜.
An incumbent strategy bk
(
k˜
)
is dominated by another strategy b′k
(
k˜
)
if it yields a strictly
worse payoﬀ against all best-reply of mutants of type Lk˜. Strategy bk
(
k˜
)
is undominated if
it is not dominated by any other strategy. Formally:
Deﬁnition 7. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration, let Lk ∈ C (µ) be an incumbent type, let Lk˜ ∈
L\C (µ) be a mutant type, let b′k
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk be strategy, and for each k′ 6= k˜ let b′k (k′) = bk (k′)
. Strategy bk
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk is dominated by b′k
(
k˜
)
if for each best-reply signal-dependent strategy
b˜k˜ : L ∪ ∅ → Σk˜: u ((Lk, bk) , (Lk˜, bk˜)) < u ((Lk, b′k) , (Lk˜, bk˜)). Strategy bk
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk is
undominated if there does not exist strategy b′k
(
k˜
)
∈ Σk such that bk
(
k˜
)
is dominated by
b′k
(
k˜
)
.
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We reﬁne the notion of neutral stability by requiring all strategies that are played against
non-existing mutants to be undominated. Formally:
Deﬁnition 8. Conﬁguration (µ, b) is undominated, if for each incumbent type Lk ∈ C (µ),
and for each mutant type Lk˜ ∈ L\C (µ), the strategy bk
(
k˜
)
is undominated.
A Conﬁguration is undominated neutrally (evolutionary) stable if it is both undominated
and neutrally (evolutionary) stable.
4.2 Result (Uniqueness)
Our second shows that any undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration must be equivalent
to (µ∗, b∗).
result gives a sharp prediction for the unique undominated neutrally stable conﬁgura-
tions in the interval A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−2
A−1 . In this conﬁguration naive players (type L1) and
moderately-sophisticated players (type L3) co-exist. Formally:
Theorem 2. Let 1
A−1 < p < 1 − 2·A−1A2−A , and let (µ, b) be an undominated neutrally stable
conﬁguration. Then (µ, b) and (µ∗, b∗) are equivalent.
The sketch of the proof is as follows (the formal proof is given in Appendix A.2). First,
observe that a conﬁguration with a single type is not stable: 1) if the type is LM , then the
entire population defects all the time, and mutants of type L1 would induce cooperation
against them and invade the population; and 2) if the type is Lk 6= LM , then mutants of
type Lk+1 can invade the population and get strictly higher payoﬀ then the incumbents. Let
Lk be the smallest (naive) type in the population. Then, it is immediate to see that type
Lk must always defect when the horizon is at most k (as it is common knowledge that all
players are rational at that stage), and all other types must defect when the horizon is at
most k + 1.
The next step is to show that a large fraction of the non-naive population must cooperate
at all horizons larger than k + 1 when facing strangers. Otherwise, a small increase in the
frequency of the naive players, would improve their ﬁtness relative to the non-naive agents (as
many non-naive loose rounds of mutual cooperation while defecting earlier then k+1 against
strangers), and the conﬁguration will be unstable. The fact that this fraction is so large,
implies that if there are non-naive players who defect at earlier horizon against strangers,
then: (1) the large fraction who defects at horizon k+1 against strangers must belong to type
Lk+1, and (2) all the remaining players (type larger than k+ 1) must defect at horizon k+ 2
against strangers and one stage before an observed opponent (who has not observed their
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type). This characterization allows to ﬁnd the unique distribution of types who satisfy the
balance of payoﬀs, but it turns out that this distribution is not stable to small perturbations
in the frequency of the diﬀerent types.
Finally, if all non-naive players defect at horizon k + 1 against strangers, then it implies
that they all defect at horizon k + 2 against observed non-naive opponents, and the balance
between the payoﬀs of the diﬀerent types imply that the frequency of naive and non-naive
players is like in µ∗. Finally, we show that if k > 1, then the conﬁguration can be invaded
by mutants of type L1, who would earn from inducing more mutual cooperation when being
observed by their opponent.
5 Stability for Low and High p-s
Our next result, shows that in the benchmark cases when p is close to 0 and 1 the undominated
neutrally stable conﬁgurations are very diﬀerent. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations must
include fully-rational players who, when facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages.
When p is close to 0, this occurs because the indirect advantage of lower types is too small
and they can not exist in a stable conﬁguration (because the probability of being identiﬁed by
the opponent is too low). When p is close to 1, there is an arms-race between sophisticated
agents who observe each other: each such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent.
The result of this race is that there must some fully-rational agents in the population.
Formally:
Theorem 3.
1. Let 0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then there exists an undominated evolutionary stable con-
ﬁguration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
where all players have type LM and they play dM against strangers
and type LM , and dk+1 against observed mutant type Lk < LM . Moreover, any other
undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration is equivalent to
(
µ˜, b˜
)
.
2. Let 1 ≥ p > A−1
A
. Then in any undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration there is a
positive frequency of players of type LM , and these players defect at all stages when
observing an opponent of type LM .
The sketch of the proof is as follows (formal proof appear in Appendix A.3):
1. Low p-s: The conﬁguration that everyone has type LM (fully-rational) and begin
defecting at the ﬁrst stage is stable because the indirect advantage of naive mutants
(with a lower type than LM) is too small: they strictly lose when their naivety is
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unobserved, and their naivety is observed too rarely. Due to a similar argument, in
any other conﬁguration where diﬀerent types co-exist, the lower type would obtain a
strictly lower payoﬀ (and this implies the uniqueness).
2. High p-s: Assume to the contrary that no agent in the population ever defects at the
ﬁrst stage. Let l < M be the horizon in which the highest type in the population begin
defecting when they observe an opponent of the same type. If p is large enough, then
their opponent is likely to observe their signal as well and begin defecting at stage l as
well. This implies (again for large enough p) that starting to defect one stage earlier
is strictly better. This implies that mutants who imitate the highest type's behavior
except defecting one stage earlier when observing an opponent with the highest type,
would achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ.
6 Robustness
In this section we demonstrate that our results are robust to various plausible changes in the
model. In Subsection 6.1 we deal with variants in the types and in the signal structure, and
in Subsection 6.2 we deal with diﬀerent stability notions.
6.1 Variants in the Model
6.1.1 Level 0
In the model we do not allow players to belong to level-0 (L0) who follow a nice and
retaliating strategy at all rounds of the interaction. Such level-0 players play a strictly-
dominated strategy (cooperating at the last stage), and we chose to omit them from the model
as such extreme bounded forward-looking may seem implausible. We note that our results
are qualitatively robust to the addition of type L0 in the following sense. All of our results
would remain shift a single step backwards: the naive players in the stable conﬁgurations
in C would be of type L0 instead of L1, and the sophisticated players would look 1-2 steps
ahead instead of 2-3 steps.
6.1.2 Asymmetric Type Observability
In the model we assume that any agent has the same probability to observe his opponent's
type. In particular, lower types may identify the exact type of a more sophisticated opponent.
One may argue (see, e.g., Mohlin (2012)) that it is more plausible that only higher types can
identify the type of their opponents. We formalize this alternative assumption as follows.
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Before the interaction begins each agent independently obtains a signal about his opponent.
With probability 1 − p the signal is non-informative (∅). With probability p the signal is
informative:
1. If the opponent's type is strictly lower, then the agent exactly identiﬁes it.
2. If the opponent's type is weakly higher, then the agent only observes that is opponent's
type is weakly higher than his own type.
One can see that all of our results remain the same in this setup.
6.1.3 Small Perturbations to the Signal Structure
Our results remain qualitatively similar if the signal structure is slightly altered by any of
the following perturbations:
1. There is a small positive correlation between the signal that each agent obtains about
his opponent's type.
2. There is a small chance that the informative signal is incorrect.
That is, if the perturbation is small enough, then there exists a unique undominated neutrally
stable conﬁguration which is closed to (µ∗, b∗)).
6.2 Diﬀerent Stability Notions
6.2.1 Focal Stability
One may argue that it is more plausible that the state of the population only speciﬁes the
behavior of players against existing types, and the behavior against mutant that introduce
new types should be evolve as part of a post-entry adaptation process. In what follows we
formalize this idea, and present an alternative notion of focal stability, and state that all our
results remain the same with this stability notion (which may be of independent interest in
future research).
A compact conﬁguration is a pair consisting of a distribution of types and the strategy
that each type uses against other types in the support of the distribution. Formally:
Deﬁnition 9. Compact Conﬁguration (µ, b) is a pair where µ ∈ ∆ (L) is the distribution
of types in the population, and b = (bk)k∈C(µ) is the proﬁle of signal-dependent strategies is
played by each type in the population given any signal with positive probability. That is, for
each type Lk ∈ C (µ) in the population, bk : C (µ)∪∅ → Σk is a signal-dependent strategy that
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speciﬁes a k-nice-retaliating strategy for each possible observation (with positive probability)
about the opponent's type.
Given a compact conﬁguration (µ, b), an invading mutant conﬁguration (µ′, b′) should
specify the signal-dependent k′-nice-retaliating strategy of each mutant type Lk′ ∈ C (µ′)
against types in the support of the post-entry population C (µ) ∪ C (µ′). Internal mutant
conﬁgurations are those that do not introduce new types to the population: C (µ′) ⊆ C (µ).
Internal mutants are interpreted as the combination of small perturbations to the frequency of
incumbent types, and experimentation of new strategies by a small group in the population.
A compact conﬁguration is internally neutrally (evolutionary) stable if any suﬃciently small
group of (non-equivalent) internal mutants would obtain a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ than
the incumbents in the post-entry population. Formally:
Deﬁnition 10. Compact conﬁguration (µ, b) is internally neutrally (evolutionary) stable if
for any internal mutant conﬁguration (µ′, b′) ((µ′, b′) 6≈ (µ, b)) with C (µ′) ⊆ C (µ) there
exists some σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every 0 <  < σ′ :
u ((µ, b) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) ≥ u ((µ′, b′) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) .
(u ((µ, b) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) > u ((µ′, b′) ,  (µ′, b′) + (1− ) (µ, b)) .)
External mutants are those that introduce a new type to the population. In this case, we
assume that the incumbent population and the new mutant type interactively adapt their
joint behavior, while taking the focal behavior of incumbents against other incumbents and
strangers as ﬁxed. We further assume that this adaptation process is fast enough relative to
the evolution of types, such that the behavior in the post-entry population converge into a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. A compact conﬁguration is (strictly) externally focally stable if
any mutant with a new type would achieve a (strictly) worse payoﬀ in the induced post-entree
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Formally:
Deﬁnition 11. Given a compact conﬁguration (µ, b),  > 0 and an external mutant type
Lk′ ∈ L\C (µ) let B (µ, b, Lk′ , ) be the set of post-entree adjusted conﬁgurations : the set of
conﬁgurations (µ′, b′) that satisfy:
1. The post-entry distribution is a mixture of  mutants and 1 −  incumbents: µ′ =
(1− ) · µ+  · Lk′ .
2. The incumbents continue to play the same (focally) as in the pre-entry conﬁguration
against strangers and other incumbents: b′k (∅) = bk (∅) for each k ∈ C (µ), (3) b′k
(
k˜
)
=
bk
(
k˜
)
for each Lk, Lk˜ ∈ C (µ).
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3. Each incumbent type best reply when facing an observed mutant.
4. The mutant type best replies to all opponents.
Deﬁnition 12. Compact conﬁguration (µ, b) is (strictly ) externally focally stable if for any
mutant type Lk′ ∈ L\C (µ) there exists some σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every 0 <  < σ′ and
in any post-entree adjusted conﬁguration (µ′, b′) ∈ B (µ, b, k′, ) the mutant obtains a lower
payoﬀ:
u ((µ, b′) , (µ′, b′)) ≥ u ((Lk′ , b′) , (µ′, b′)) .
(u ((µ, b′) , (µ′, b′)) > u ((Lk′ , b′) , (µ′, b′)) .)
Finally, a compact conﬁguration is (strictly) focally stable if it is both neutrally (evolu-
tionary) stable and (strictly) externally focally stable. Simple adaptations to the proofs in
the appendix yield the same results with focal stability. Formally (proof is omitted):
Proposition 2. Let A
(A−1)2 < p < 1 − 2·A−1A2−A and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then the
compact conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is strictly focally stable. Moreover, if (µ, b) is a focally stable
conﬁguration then (µ, b) and (µ∗, b∗) are equivalent.
6.2.2 DEY-Stability (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007))
In our deﬁnition of focal stability the incumbents only approximately best-reply in the post-
entry population, because they keep their play against incumbents and strangers the same,
and do not adjust it to the presence of the new  mutants. In some evolutionary setups, the
adaptation process according to which agents choose their strategies might be much faster
then the evolutionary process according to which the frequency of the types evolve. In these
setups, it may be plausible to assume that the post-entree population adjust their play into
an exact Bayesian-Nash equilibrium after any entree of mutants (both external and internal
mutants).
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s notion of stability makes this assumption.11 A compact
conﬁguration (µ, b) is (strictly) DEY-stable if:
1. The strategy proﬁle b is:
(a) A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the Bayesian game with the distribution of types
µ.
11 A similar approach is also used in the notions of mental equilibrium (Winter, Garcia-Jurado, and Mendez-
Naya (2010)) and evolutionary-stable types (Alger and Weibull (2012)). Both notions apply only to homoge-
nous populations that includes a single type, and thus are less appropriate to study stability of heterogeneous
populations.
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(b) Balanced - it induces the same payoﬀ to all types in C (µ).
2. For each mutant type Lk ∈ L, there exists suﬃciently small 0 such that for each
 < 0, after  mutants of type Lk invade the population:
(a) There exist post-entry Bayesian-Nash equilibria in which the incumbents play is
only slightly changed relative to the pre-entry play.
(b) In all these equilibria the mutants would achieve a (strictly) lower payoﬀ than the
incumbents.
With simple adaptations, Lemmas 3-4 apply also for DEY-stability. This immediately implies
the following theorem.
Proposition 3. Let A
(A−1)2 < p < 1 − 2·A−1A2−A and let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small. Then the
compact conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is strictly DEY-stable.
Moreover, any other DEY-stable conﬁguration (µ, b) has similar qualitative properties:
1. Naive agents of type L1 exist in the population.
2. Moderately-sophisticated types ( a non-empty subset of {L2, L3, L4}) co-exist together
with the naive type.
3. Higher levels of sophistication (L5and above) do not exist.
The reasons that we have to replace the uniqueness with the weaker qualitative unique-
ness is that Lemma 6 does not apply for DEY-stability:
• Part (1) of Lemma 6 does not hold in this setup, because after  mutants of type Lk˜
who always play d3 enter the population, the incumbents adjust their strategies into
an exact Bayesian-Nash equilibrium by lowering the frequency of incumbent of type
Lk˜ would play d3. We note that this adjustment that is implied by Dekel, Ely, and
Yilankaya (2007)'s deﬁnition works in the opposite direction to the incentives that the
incumbents face: if a random perturbation slightly increased the frequency of Lk˜ play
d3, then the incumbents who play d3 obtain a higher payoﬀ, but the adjustment process
into a new equilibrium lowers their frequency in the population.
• Part (4) of Lemma 6 because Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s deﬁnition only con-
siders entry of mutants with a single type.
Finally, we note that if one adapts Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s deﬁnition by assuming
that the adjustment into a new exact equilibrium takes place only after the entree of external
mutants, then all of our results, including the uniqueness and Lemma 6 would hold.
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7 Concluding remarks
1. Other heuristics for long horizons: In our model we assumed that all players use
nice and retaliating heuristics whenever the horizon is larger than their forward-looking
ability. One could relax this assumption by allowing a player to choose his strategy
for long horizons from some ﬁxed set of heuristics. For example, the set of possible
heuristics might be the strategies with memory-1 (which depend only on the actions
observed in the previous stage). Note that these memory-1 strategies include the
grim and tit-for-tat heuristics. A strategy of a player of type Lk in this setup
speciﬁes two strategic components for each possible signal about the opponent's type:
(1) the heuristic he plays when the horizon is larger than k, and (2) the (unrestricted)
strategy he plays when the horizon is at most k. It is immediate to apply our ﬁrst
result (Proposition 4) in this setup, and show that any conﬁguration in C in which all
players choose grim as their heuristic is stable. We conjuncture that there are only
two sets of stable conﬁgurations in this extended setup: (1) eﬃcient conﬁgurations:
type distribution and strategies are equivalent to (µ∗, b∗), all players use heuristics that
cooperate as long as the opponent never defected before, and a large enough proportion
of each type defects if the opponent defected in the previous stage (a nice and retaliating
heuristic); and (2) ineﬃcient conﬁgurations in which all players defect at all stages (and
use always-defect heuristic).
2. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium: Our model of bounded forward looking
types could also be formulated using Jehiel (2005)'s Analogy-Based Expectation Equi-
librium (ABEE). In this formulation a player of type Lk bundles all nodes with horizon
of at least k into a single analogy class (while fully-diﬀerentiating among nodes with
horizons smaller than k), and expects his opponent to play the same in all nodes of
this class. The requirement that players play an evolutionary reﬁnement of a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium in a conﬁguration is replaced with the requirement that players play
an analogous evolutionary reﬁnement of ABEE in a conﬁguration: at each stage ev-
ery player best-responses to his analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly
represent the average behavior in every class. As in the previous remark: (1) it is
immediate to show that every conﬁguration in C is stable in this formulation (and play-
ers choose to play a nice and retaliating heuristic in their non-trivial analogy class),
and (2) we conjuncture that there are only two sets of stable conﬁgurations in this
ABEE formulation: eﬃcient (µ∗, b∗)-like conﬁgurations, and ineﬃcient always-defect
conﬁgurations.
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3. Random continuation probability: Our model assumes that the repeated interac-
tion has a deterministic constant length, and that players completely ignore this fact
when the horizon is too large. These assumptions may seem unrealistic. However,
one should note that the model may be a reduced-form for a more realistic inter-
action with a random length and incomplete information. Speciﬁably, let T be the
random unknown length of each interaction. Assume that the interaction lasts at least
M rounds (Pr (T ≥M) = 1), and that the continuation probability at each stage
(Pr (T > n|T > n− 1)) is not too far from 1. Bounded forward-looking is modeled
in this setup as the stage in which a player becomes aware to the timing of the ﬁnal
period: player of type Lk gets a signal about the ﬁnal period of the interaction (i.e.,
about the realization of T) k stages before the end. In this setup, players are not re-
stricted in their strategies (each type may play any strategy at any horizon). As in the
previous remarks: (1) it is immediate to see that any conﬁguration in (µ∗, b∗) is stable,
and (2) we conjuncture that there are only two sets of stable conﬁgurations: eﬃcient
(µ∗, b∗)-like conﬁgurations, and ineﬃcient always-defect conﬁgurations.
4. Other games: The formal analysis deals only with iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. How-
ever, we conjuncture that the results can be extended to other games in which iterated
reasoning decreases payoﬀs. In particular, the extension of our results to centipede-
like games (Rosenthal (1981)) is relatively straightforward. Such game can represent
sequential interactions of gift exchanges. Such interactions were important in primitive
hunter-gatherer populations (see, e.g., Haviland, Prins, and Walrath (2007), P. 440),
which driven the biological evolution of human characteristics.
A Proofs
A.1 Stability of (µ∗, b∗)
Proposition 4. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
and let δ > 0 suﬃciently small. Then the conﬁguration
(µ∗, b∗) (characterized in Theorem 2) is an undominated strongly neutrally stable.
Proof. It is immediate to see that (µ∗, b∗) does not use strictly dominated strategies against
mutant types and thus it is undominated conﬁguration. In order to prove that is is neutrally
stable, we ﬁrst show two auxiliary results: (µ∗, b∗) is balanced (Lemma 1), and b∗ is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (given µ∗) which is strict with respect to on-equilibrium-path
deviations (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. Conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is balanced (induce the same payoﬀ to all types in C (µ∗)).
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Proof. Let q = µ (L1) be the frequency of the naive players. A naive player gets (L− 1)A+1
against a naive opponent, and (L− 2)A + 1 against a sophisticated opponent (type L3). A
sophisticated player gets (L− 2)A+ (A+ 1) + 1 = (L− 1)A+ 2 against a naive opponent,
and against a sophisticated opponent he gets: (L− 3)A+3 if both players identify each other,
(L− 3)A+ (A+ 1) + 2 = (L− 2)A+ 3 if only he identiﬁes his opponent, (L− 3)A+ 0 + 2
if only his opponent identiﬁes him, and (L− 2)A + 2 if both players identify each other.
Denote by δ3 = δ · c (L3) the cognitive cost of type L3. The diﬀerent types get the same
payoﬀ if:
q · ((L− 1) · A+ 1) + (1− q) · ((L− 2) · A+ 1) + δ3 = q · ((L− 1) · A+ 2) + (1− q) ·(
p2 ((L− 3)A+ 3) + p (1− p) (((L− 2) · A+ 3) + ((L− 3) · A+ 2)) + (1− p)2 ((L− 2) · A+ 2))
(1− q) ((L− 2)A+ 1− ((L− 3)A+ 1 + 2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 2 + 1) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1)))+δ3 = q
q = (1− q) · (A− (2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 3) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1))) + δ3
q = (1− q) (A− (p2 (2− A− 3 + A+ 1) + p (A+ 3− 2A− 2) + (A+ 1))) + δ3
q = (1− q) (A− (p (1− A) + (A+ 1))) + δ3
q = (1− q) (−p (1− A)− 1) + δ3 = (1− q) (p (A− 1)− 1) + δ3
q (p (A− 1)− 1 + 1) = p (A− 1)− 1 + δ3
q =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ3
p (A− 1) . (1)
Note that for each p > 1
A−1 we get a valid value of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 for suﬃciently small δ.
Lemma 2. The strategy proﬁle b∗ is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium given a distribution of
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types µ∗. Moreover, any deviation that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-path, yields a
strictly worse outcome.
Proof. We have to show that both types play a best response (among the k-nice-retaliating
strategies). This is immediate for a naive player (L1), as his only choice is between cooperat-
ing and defecting at the last stage, and the latter strictly dominates the former. We have to
show that a sophisticated player (L3) play best response. It is immediate that d2 is a strict
best response against an observed naive opponent. Next, we show that playing d2 against
a stranger is strictly better than playing d3. This is true if the following inequality holds
(looking at the payoﬀ of the last 3 rounds):
q (2A+ 2) + (1− q) (2p+ (1− p) (A+ 2)) > q (A+ 3) + (1− q) (3p+ (1− p) (A+ 3))
q (A− 1) > (1− q) ⇔ q > 1
A
.
Using (1) one obtains:
p (A− 1)− 1
p (A− 1) >
1
A
⇔ pA (A− 1)− A > p (A− 1)
pA2 − pA− A > pA− p ⇔ p (A2 − 2A+ 1) > A ⇔ p > A
(A− 1)2 .
It is immediate that d2 is also strictly better (against strangers) than any other strategy
that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-path. We are left with showing that it is strict
better for a sophisticated player to play d3 and not d4 against a sophisticated opponent (and
this immediately implies that d3 is strictly better against identiﬁed sophisticated opponents
than any other strategy that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-path). This is true if
the following inequality holds (focusing on the payoﬀs of the last 4 rounds, as all preceding
payoﬀs are the same):
p (A+ 3) + (1− p) (2A+ 3) > p (A+ 4) + (1− p) (A+ 4)
(1− p) (A− 1) > p ⇔ A− 1 > Ap ⇔ p < A− 1
A
.
We now use the lemmas to prove that (µ∗, b∗) is strongly neutrally stable. That is, we
have to show that after an invasion of  mutants of conﬁguration (µ, b) ((µ, b) 6≈ (µ∗, b∗)), the
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incumbents obtain a strictly higher payoﬀ than the mutants in the post-entree population
(for suﬃciently small  > 0).
Consider ﬁrst mutants of types L1 or L3 (which exist in the pre-entry population). If these
mutants play diﬀerently against incumbents (strangers, L1 or L3) then they earn strictly worse
by the previous lemmas. Thus, such mutants must play the same against incumbent types
and strangers (and may only diﬀer in their play against mutant types other than L1 and
L3). Denote such mutants as imitating mutants. Note that when the proportion of naive
agents become larger (smaller) relative to its proportion in µ∗ (and agents still follow b∗),
then the naive agents achieve a lower (higher) payoﬀ than the sophisticated agents. This is
because naive agents obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ than sophisticated agents, when facing
naive opponents (the sophisticated players obtain an additional ﬁtness point by defecting
when the horizon is equal to 2). This implies that imitating mutants obtain a strictly
lower payoﬀ than the incumbents when facing incumbents or imitating mutants (unless the
imitating mutants have the same distribution of types as the incumbents, and then they
obtain the same payoﬀ).
Next, consider mutant of diﬀerent types (L2 or L4 or more). Mutants of type L2 achieve
a strictly lower payoﬀ against incumbents: they have the same payoﬀ as L3 in most cases,
but they obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ when they observe an opponent of type L3 (due to
their inability to defect 3 stages before the end). Mutants of higher types (L4or more) obtain
at most the incumbents' payoﬀ when facing incumbents, while they have a strictly larger
cognitive cost (δ · c (L4)). Thus also these mutants achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ than the
incumbents. Finally, mutants may gain an advantage from a secret-handshake like behavior
() - playing the same against incumbent types and strangers, while cooperating with each
other when observing a mutant type (diﬀerent then L1 and L3). However, for suﬃciently
small , such an advantage cannot compensate for the strict disadvantages mentioned above,
and this implies that any conﬁguration of mutants would obtain a strictly worse payoﬀ than
the incumbents (unless they are equivalent, and then they obtain the same payoﬀ).
A.2 Uniqueness of (µ∗, b∗)
Proposition 5. Let 1
A−1 < p < 1− 2·A−1A2−A and let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration that is not equivalent
to (µ∗, b∗). Then (µ, b) is not undominated neutrally stable.
The proposition follows immediately from the following ﬁve lemmas.
First, Lemma 3 shows that dominated neutrally stable conﬁguration must include more
than one type in their support, and that the lowest type must be L1 or L2. Formally:
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Lemma 3. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration such that b is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium given µ.
Let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population. Then:
1. Everyone defects (with probability 1) at any horizon weakly smaller than k1.
2. Any type Lk 6= Lk1 in the population defects (with probability 1) at horizon k1 + 1.
3. If k1 < M and µ (Lk1) = 1 the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
4. If k1 > 2 and p >
1
A−1 then the conﬁguration is not dominated neutrally stable.
5. If p > 1
A−1 then Lk1 ∈ {L1, L2} and µ (Lk1) < 1.
Proof.
1. It is common knowledge that all types are at least k1. This implies that defecting when
the horizon is at most k1, defecting at all remaining stages is the unique strategy that
survives iterations of eliminating dominated strategies, and thus all players must defect
with probability 1 when the horizon is at most k1 given any signal about the opponent.
2. Part (1) implies that defecting is strictly better than cooperating at horizon k1 + 1 for
agents of type higher than k1.
3. Observe that if k1 < M , then  mutants of type Lk1+1 who play dk1+1 and enter the
population, would outperform the incumbents.
4. For a suﬃciently small  > 0 , mutants of type L1 who enter the population (and play
d1) would achieve a higher payoﬀ (for any δ > 0) if:
(A− 2) · p > 1− p ⇔ P > 1
A− 1
This is because when type L1 is identiﬁed, it is strictly dominating for his observing
opponent to cooperate at all horizons strictly larger than 2. Thus, when being observed,
L1 mutants get at least (A− 2) ﬁtness points more than Lk1 (as the opponent will
cooperate for at least one more turn). When being unobserved, L1 mutants obtain at
most 1 point less than the Lk1 incumbents.
5. It is immediately implied by parts (3) and (4).
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The following lemma shows that if everyone cooperates at all horizons strictly larger
than k1 + 1 in a dominated neutrally-stable conﬁguration, then this conﬁguration must be
equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
Lemma 4. Let A−1
A
> p. Let (µ, b) be an undominated neutrally stable strategy, and let type
Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population such that µ (Lk1) < 1 and k1 ≤ M − 2.
Denote the remaining types in C (µ) besides Lk1 as non-naive incumbents. Assume that
all types in the population cooperate at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing
strangers. Then:
1. No one defects at horizon strictly larger then k1 + 2 against any incumbent.
2. All non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 against strangers or observed type Lk1, and plays
dk1+2 against any non-naive observed incumbent.
3. No player in the population has type strictly larger than Lk1+2.
4. The population only includes types {Lk1 , Lk1+2}.
5.
µ (Lk1) =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ · (c (Lk1+2)− c (Lk1))
p (A− 1)
(for any p > 1
A−1 , and no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists if p <
1
A−1).
6. (µ, b) and (µ∗, b∗) are equivalent conﬁgurations.
Proof.
1. We have to show that playing dk1+2 is strictly better then an earlier defection against an
observed non-naive incumbent. This is because defecting at horizon k1 + 3 (defecting
at horizon strictly larger than k1 + 3) yields A − 1 (at least 2 · (A− 1)) less points
than dk1+2 against an unobserving opponent and at most 1 (2) more points than dk1+2
against an observing opponent. Thus dk1+2 is strictly better than defecting at horizon
of at least k1 + 3 if:
(1− p) · (A− 1) > p ⇔ (A− 1) > A · p ⇔ A− 1
A
> p.
2. By part (2) of the previous lemma all non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 when facing
strangers or observed Lk1 . It is immediate that dk1+2 is strictly better than defecting
at horizon of at most k1 + 1 when facing an observed incumbent. By the previous part,
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any incumbent with type strictly larger then Lk1+1 play dk1+2 against observed non-
naive incumbents. In order to complete the proof we have to show that all non-naive
incumbents have type diﬀerent then Lk1+1. Assume to the contrary that: (I) all non-
naive incumbents have type Lk1+1; this implies that mutants of type Lk1+2who play
dk1+2against non-naive incumbents and dk1+1 against strangers or naive incumbents,
would outperform the incumbents; or (II) Some of the non-naive incumbents have type
Lk1+1 while other incumbents have higher types; then for suﬃciently small δ > 0, the
latter group outperform the former.
3. Assume to the contrary that there are players of type strictly higher than Lk1+2. If
there are also incumbents of type Lk1+1 then the previous part shows that both groups
play the same on-equilibrium-path, and thus the agents with the strictly higher types
must obtain strictly lower payoﬀs due to the cognitive costs. Otherwise, any best-reply
mutant type Lk1+1 must play dk1+1 against strangers and naive incumbents, and this
implies that in any undominated conﬁguration, non-naive incumbents cannot defect at
horizons strictly higher than k1+2 when facing an observed mutant type Lk1+1. This
implies that such mutants would outperform the incumbents due to the cognitive costs.
4. This is immediate from the previous two parts.
5. In any balanced conﬁguration the naive and the non-naive incumbents must have the
same payoﬀ. By repeating the calculation of Lemma 1, this can only hold if µ (Lk1) =
p(A−1)−1+δ·(c(Lk1+2)−c(Lk1))
p(A−1) > 0 .
6. If Lk1 = L1 then the previous parts imply that (µ, b) and (µ
∗, b∗) are equivalent conﬁg-
urations. Assume to the contrary that Lk1 = L2. We now show that  mutants of type
L1 who invade the population would outperform the incumbents of type L2 (and this
immediately implies that the mutants also outperform the incumbents of type L4, as
the post-entree diﬀerence in the payoﬀs between the incumbents is O ()). When facing
an opponent of type L2 or an unobserving opponent of type L4, the mutants obtain one
less point. When facing an observing opponent of type L4, the mutants obtain A − 1
more ﬁtness points. Thus the mutants achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ if:
µ (L2) + µ (L4) · (1− p) < p · (A− 1) · µ (L4) ,
µ (L2) + µ (L4) < p · A · µ (L4) ⇔ 1 < p · A · µ (L4) ⇔ µ (L4) > 1
p · A.
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By the previous part:
µ (L4) =
1− δ · (c (L4)− c (L2))
p · (A− 1) >
1
p · A
for a suﬃciently small δ.
Lemma 5. Let 1− 2·A−1
A2−A > p. Let (µ, b) be an undominated neutrally stable strategy, and let
type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population such that µ (Lk1) < 1 and k1 ≤M−2.
Denote the remaining types in C (µ) besides Lk1 as non-naive incumbents. Let η be the mean
probability that a random non-naive incumbent cooperates at all horizons strictly larger than
k1 + 1 when facing a stranger. Assume that 0 < η < 1. Then:
1. µ (Lk1) ≤ 1A .
2. If p > 1
(A−1)2 , then Lk1 = L1.
3.
η >
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) .
4. η of the non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 against strangers and the remaining 1 − η
play dk1+2 against strangers.
5. When facing any incumbent, all types cooperate with probability 1 at all horizons strictly
larger than k1 + 3.
6. No player in the population has type strictly larger than Lk1+3.
Proof.
1. The fact that there are incumbents who defect with with positive probability at horizons
strictly larger than k1 + 1 against strangers implies that early defection (at horizon
strictly earlier than k1 + 1) yields a weakly-better payoﬀ than dk1+1 against strangers.
Early defection at horizon k1 + 2 (>k1 + 2) yields at least A− 1 (2 · (A− 1)) less ﬁtness
points against naive agents, and at most 1 (2) more points against non-naive opponents.
This can hold only if:
µ (Lk1) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− µ (Lk1)) · 1
µ (Lk1) ≤
1
A
. (2)
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2. Assume to the contrary that k1 > 1. Observe that  mutants of type L1 would outper-
form the incumbents of type Lk1(and thus would outperform all the incumbents in the
post-entry conﬁguration ) if:
p · (A− 1) · (1− µ (L2)) > µ (L2) · 1
This is because the mutants of type L1 earn at-least A − 1 more points when their
type is observed by a non-naive incumbent, they earn the same when their type is not
observed by a non-naive incumbent, and they earn at most 1 less point when playing
against a naive incumbent (type Lk1). Thus the mutants would achieve a strictly higher
payoﬀ if:
p · (A− 1) > µ (L2) · (1 + p · (A− 1)) ⇔ p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) > µ (L2) .
Substituting (2) yields:
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) >
1
A
⇔ p · A · (A− 1) > 1 + p · (A− 1) ⇔ p > 1
(A− 1)2 .
To simplify notation, we will assume k1 = 1 in the following proofs (though they hold
also for k1 6= 1 which may be possible for p ≤ 1(A−1)2 ).
3. Type L1 gets (L− 1) ·A+ 1 points when playing against itself. A random player with
a type diﬀerent than L1 who plays against L1 gets at most (L− 1) ·A+ 1 + 1 when he
observes his opponent's type, and an expected payoﬀ of at most η · ((L− 1)A+ 2) +
(1− η) · ((L− 2) · A+ 3). This implies that a necessary condition for other types to
achieve a higher payoﬀ (on average) when playing against L1 than the payoﬀ that L1
gets against itself is (subtracting the equal amount of (L− 2) ·A+ 1 from each payoﬀ):
A < p · (A+ 1) + (1− p) · (η · (A+ 1) + 2 · (1− η))
A < 1 + p · A+ (1− p) · (η · A+ 1− η) ⇔ A− 1
1− p < η · A+ 1− η
A− 1− 1
1− p < η · (A− 1) ⇔ 1−
1
(A− 1) · (1− p) < η
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) < η (3)
If (3) does not hold, then the conﬁguration cannot be naturally stable, because a
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suﬃciently small group of mutants with type L1 who play d1 would outperform the
incumbents.
4. We show that when facing strangers, all types cooperate with probability 1 at all
horizons strictly larger than 3. Assume to the contrary that there is a type who defects
with positive probability against strangers at horizon l > 3. This implies that defecting
at horizon l yields a weakly better payoﬀ against strangers than d3. This can occur
only if:
η · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− η) + η · p.
This is because if l = 4 (l > 4), dk1+2 yields A − 1 (at least 2 · (A− 1) ) more points
against non-observing opponents who cooperate at all horizons larger than 2, and it
yields at most 1 (2) less points against any other opponents. This implies:
η · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ 1− η · (1− p) ⇔ η · (1− p) · A ≤ 1 (1− p) ⇔ η ≤ 1
(1− p) · A.
Substituting (3) yields:
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) ≤
1
(1− p) · A ⇔ A · ((A− 1) · (1− p)− 1) ≤ A− 1
A · (A− 1) · (1− p)− A ≤ A− 1 ⇔ A · (A− 1) · (1− p) ≤ 2 · A− 1
1− p ≤ 2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1) ⇔ p ≥ 1−
2 · A− 1
A2 − A
and we get a contradiction to p < 1 − 2·A−1
A2−A . By part (2) of Lemma 3, all non-naive
incumbents defect with probability 1 at any horizon of at most 2. This implies that η
of the non-naive incumbents play d2 against strangers and the remaining 1− η play d3
against strangers.
5. The proof repeats the same argument of part (1) of the previous lemma.
6. The proof repeats the same argument of part (3) of the previous lemma.
Lemma 6. Let 1 > p > 0. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration, and let type L1 ∈ C (µ) be the
smallest type in the population (µ (Lk1) < 1). Denote the remaining types in C (µ) besides L1
as non-naive incumbents. Let η be the mean probability that a random non-naive incumbent
cooperates at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing a stranger. Assume that
0 < η < 1. Then (µ, b) cannot be undominated neutrally stable.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (µ, b) is undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration.
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1. All players who play d2 against strangers have type L2.
Assume to the contrary that there is a type Lk˜ (k˜ > 2) that plays d2 with positive
probability against strangers (and by the previous lemma it plays d3 with the remaining
probability). Consider the following conﬁguration of mutants: (µ′, b′): (1) µ′ = µ , (2)
for each k 6= k˜, b′k = bk, (3) for each Lk ∈ L, b′k˜ (k) = bk˜ (k), and (4) b′k˜ (∅) = d3. That
is, the mutants have the same distribution of types as the incumbents, and they play
the same except that mutants of type Lk˜ always play d3 when facing strangers. Observe
that such mutants would outperform the incumbents: mutants of type diﬀerent than Lk˜
obtain the same payoﬀ as their counter incumbents, mutants of type Lk˜ would achieve
a strictly higher payoﬀ when facing an unobserved opponent of type Lk˜ (pre-entry both
d2 and d3 yielded the same payoﬀ; post-entry there are a bit more early defectors and
thus d3 yield a strictly higher payoﬀ), and would obtain the same payoﬀ in all other
cases. This implies that the conﬁguration cannot be neutrally-stable.
2. C (µ) = {L1, L2, L4}. Type L1 always plays d1, type L2 always plays d2, and type L4
plays d2 against observed L1, d3 against strangers and observed L2, and plays d4 against
observed L4.
By the previous lemma, there are no types strictly higher than L4. By a similar
argument to part (2) of Lemma 4, this implies that agents of type L4 who play as the
incumbents of type L3 except that they play d4 against an observed type L3, would
outperform agents of type L3. Thus, type L3 cannot be in the support of the population.
The strategies that each type plays against other incumbents follow immediately from
previous lemma and from the previous part of this lemma.
3. To simplify notation we characterize the frequency of each type in the case where the
cognitive costs converge to 0 (δ → o). The arguments work very similarly (but the
notation is more cumbersome) for for small enough δ. Then:
µ (L1) =
1
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 , µ (L2) = 1−
1 + A− p · (A− 1)
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 ,
µ (L4) =
1
p · (A− 1) + 1 .
Let µk = µ (Lk). The fact that (µ, b) is a balanced conﬁguration implies that types
L1 and L2 should have the same payoﬀ. Type L2 obtains 1 more ﬁtness point against
types L1 and L2, the same payoﬀ against an unobserving type L4, and A−1 less points
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against an observing type L4. The balance between the payoﬀs implies:
(1− µ4) = µ4 · p · (A− 1) ⇔ µ4 = 1
p · (A− 1) + 1 . (4)
Similarly, L2 and L4 should have the same payoﬀ. Type L2 obtain 1 less ﬁtness point
against opponent of type L2, the same against observed type L1, A − 1 more points
against unobserved type L1, and the comparison against opponent of type L4 depends
on the observability: A−2 more points when both types are observed, 1 less point when
both types are unobserved, 2 less points when only the opponent was observed, and
A− 1 more points when only the opponent was observing. Thus, the balance between
the payoﬀs implies (taking into account also the cognitive costs):
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 ·
(
p2 · (A− 2)− (1− p)2 + p · (1− p) · (A− 1− 2)) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 ·
(
p2 · (A− 3)− 1 + 2p+ (p− p2) · (A− 3)) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 · (p · (A− 3)− 1 + 2p) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 · (p · (A− 1)− 1) = µ2 = 1− µ1 − µ4
µ4 · p · (A− 1) = 1− µ1 · (1 + (1− p) · (A− 1))
µ4 · p · (A− 1) = 1− µ1 · (A− p · (A− 1))
µ1 · (A− p · (A− 1)) = 1− µ4 · p · (A− 1)
µ1 =
1− µ4 · p · (A− 1)
A− p · (A− 1)
Substituting (4) yields:
µ1 =
1− p·(A−1)
p·(A−1)+1
A− p · (A− 1) =
1
p·(A−1)+1
A− p · (A− 1)
µ1 =
1
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) =
1
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 .
This implies that:
µ2 = 1− µ1 − µ4 = 1− 1
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) −
1
p · (A− 1) + 1
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µ2 = 1− 1 + A− p · (A− 1)
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) = 1−
1 + A− p · (A− 1)
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1))
µ2 = 1− 1 + A− p · (A− 1)
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 .
If any of the µi-s is not between 0 and 1 then no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists.
4. The conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
A direct algebraic calculation reveals that for suﬃciently small , ′ > 0:
(a) If p < 0.5 then  imitating mutants with a conﬁguration (µ′, b′) with µ′ (L1) =
1− µ (L4) + ′, µ′ (L2) = 0, µ′ (L4) = µ (L4)− ′, and b′ = b (play the same as the
incumbents) outperform the incumbents in the post-entry population.
(b) If p > 0.5  imitating mutants with a conﬁguration (µ′, b′) with µ′ (L1) = 0,
µ′ (L2) = 1−µ (L4)+′, µ′ (L4) = µ (L4)−′, and b′ = b outperform the incumbents
post-entry population for suﬃciently small .
A.3 Theorem 3 - Stable Conﬁgurations Near 0 and 1
Theorem. 3
1. Let 0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then there exists an undominated neutrally stable conﬁgura-
tion
(
µ˜, b˜
)
where all players have type LM and they play dM against strangers and type
LM , and dk+1 against observed mutant type Lk < LM . Moreover, any other neutrally
stable conﬁguration is equivalent to
(
µ˜, b˜
)
.
2. Let 1 ≥ p > A−1
A
. Then in any stable conﬁguration there is a positive frequency of
players of type LM , and these players defect at all stages when observing an opponent
of type LM .
Proof.
1. We begin by showing the stability of the conﬁguration in which all players have type
LM and they defect at all stages. It is immediate that player best reply to each other.
Consider  mutants with type k < L who invade the population. When facing in-
cumbents, the mutants obtain 1 ﬁtness point less when their type is unobserved, and
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(A− 1) · (M − k − 1) − 1 more ﬁtness points when their type is observed. Thus for
suﬃciently small  and δ, the incumbents achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ if:
(1− p) > p · ((A− 1) · (M − k − 1)− 1) ⇔ 1 > p · (A− 1) · (M − k − 1)
p <
1
(A− 1) · (M − k − 1) .
This implies that for any p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) , the conﬁguration is undominated neutrally
stable.
Next we show that any non-equivalent conﬁguration cannot be neutrally stable when
p < 1
A−1 (thus, if
1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p <
1
A−1 then no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists). If
all players in the population have type LM then they must all play dM in any Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium, as it is the unique serially strictly undominated strategy. Otherwise,
let Lk < LM be the smallest type in the support of the population. If k = M − 1, then
it is immediate that agents with type LM would outperform agents with type LM−1.
If k ≤ M − 2, then by repeating the arguments in Lemmas 3-6, one can see that no
undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration exists.
2. Let Lk be the highest type in the population. Let l be the largest horizon in which Lk
begins defecting with positive probability against an observed opponent of the same
type. If this probability is strictly less than 1, then by a similar argument to Part (1)
of Lemma 6, the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable ( imitating mutants who diﬀer
only in that their Lk-s play dl with probability 1 would achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ
in the post-entry population). Now, if l < k, then  mutants of type Lk who play
dl+1 (start defecting one stage earlier) against observed Lk, and play the same as the
incumbents in all other cases, would outperform the incumbents of type Lk (and this
implies they would outperform all incumbents):
p > (1− p) · (A− 1) ⇔ p · A > (A− 1) ⇔ p > A− 1
A
(because the mutants obtain 1 more point when their observed Lk opponent observes
their type, and they get at most A − 1 less points when he does not observe their
type; they obtain the same payoﬀ against strangers and other observed opponents).
From similar reasons, If l = k < M , then  mutants of type Lk+1 who play dk+1against
observed Lk, and play the same as the incumbents of type Lk in all other cases, would
outperform incumbents of type Lk (and this implies they would outperform all incum-
bents) in any undominated neutrally stable conﬁguration.
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